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Abstract: A growing body of literature on the commons has provided fascinating 
and intricate insights on how some local institutions have successfully managed 
to avoid a seemingly inevitable “tragedy of the commons” once popularized by 
Garrett Hardin. Primarily benefitting from the recent studies on the common-
pool resources conducted by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues, polycentric self-
organization and autonomy, rather than the direct state or market control over the 
commons, are often recognized as key features of the long enduring commons. 
However, these commons are quite diverse and the outcomes are often multiple 
and complex, accentuating the needs to differentiate among multiple commons 
outcomes. Furthermore, relatively under-reported are the cases where the 
degradation of common-pool resources are actually halted, and even restored. 
This study examines both the turbulent history of fishery mismanagement in 
Rupa Lake, Nepal and its reversal built around the participation, engagement 
and inclusiveness in the governance of its watershed. We find that Rupa Lake’s 
experience tells two stories. Reflecting Hardin’s dire forecast, the Rupa Lake 
watershed verged on collapse as population grew and seemingly selfish behavior 
intensified under an open-access regime. But the users also found a way to 
rebound and reverse their course as they adopted a bottom-up approach to fishery 
management and established an innovative community institution, the ‘Rupa Lake 
Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative’, dedicated to the sustainable governance 
of the commons. This case highlights how one community at the threshold of 
‘tragedy’ transformed itself by turning conflict into collaboration, which we hope 
contributes to the effort of better understanding multiple commons.
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1. Introduction
Rangelands, forests, riverbanks and lakes constitute resource commons – natural 
capital of which members of a community share access. With the growth in 
population, the competition for resource commons between communities has 
heightened, resulting sometimes in conflict (Homer-Dixon 1994; Escobar 2006; 
Sekeris 2014). This increasingly salient problem has thus given rise to questions 
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regarding how to properly manage resource commons, or Common-Pool 
Resources (CPRs).
Part of the contemporary debate on this issue may be traced to the 1968 
publication of Paul Ehrlich’s book, The Population Bomb, and, later that same 
year, to an article in Science, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” authored by 
biologist Garrett Hardin. While both Ehrlich and Hardin were concerned with 
population growth, Hardin also thought, philosophically, about how a growing 
community might share resource commons. Hardin was specifically critical of 
an idea, often associated (incorrectly) with Adam Smith, that “decisions reached 
individually will… be the best decisions for an entire society” (1968, 1244–1245). 
Hardin contends that human beings are selfish and short-sighted and individuals 
acting in their own self-interest would not “promote the common good,” as Smith 
supposedly speculated.1 Instead, contrary to Smith, Hardin asserts that “ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush” if each individual attends only to “his own 
best interest” (emphasis added). Applying this logic to commons management, 
Hardin argues that if each seeks only to maximize their own personal gain, which 
comes naturally to any “rational being,” the commons will eventually be destroyed.
Thus, unless our biologically endowed instincts are somehow radically 
transformed, tragedy is inevitable; the common pasture will be overgrazed, the 
common lake overexploited, and the common forest cleared. Cognizant of the 
fact that amending human nature would likely prove an impossible difficulty, 
Hardin’s analysis led him instead to conclude that in order to avert tragedy on the 
commons, an external force was called for – one that would have to be imposed 
upon communities sharing resources. For Hardin, only two systems presented 
themselves as logical solutions: shared resources must either be parceled up and 
allotted to the greater responsibilities of private ownership, or they must be strictly 
regulated by an interventionist authority, which elsewhere Hardin describes as 
a “Leviathan,” borrowing language from Hobbes’s description of an absolutist 
and autocratic state (1978, 314). Although Hardin noted that his proposals were 
“objectionable,” he nevertheless insisted that “we must choose – or acquiesce in 
the destruction of the commons” (1968, 1245).
1
 Hardin is mistaken, as are many free-market enthusiasts, when he suggests that Smith’s account 
somehow justifies, if correct, laissez-faire economics. Quite the opposite appears to be Smith’s inten-
tion. A careful reading of the chapter where the Smith invokes his now famous metaphor about the 
‘invisible hand’ (which is used exactly once and is in any case irrelevant to his theory of competitive 
markets) would not lead one to take it as implying that selfish behaviour is either directly or indirectly 
beneficial to society. Rather, Smith is attempting to demonstrate two things. First, that capital support 
of domestic (and not foreign) trade may be advantageous to the domestic economy, but that this is 
largely the result of a bias for the home country (a merchant may prefer to operate where he knows 
the laws, for instance). This preference, or bias, has the unintended consequence of bolstering do-
mestic industry (thus the public prospers “led by an invisible hand”). Smith goes on to note, however, 
if such a bias did not exist, the free movement of capital and trade might actually be harmful to the 
domestic population – the “home market” [Great Britain] – who “would probably suffer” under such 
conditions (Smith 2003, 568–576).
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Borrowing from the overlapping disciplines of economics and political science, 
Hardin begins his discussion on resource commons by uncritically adopting two 
widely held theoretical paradigms: rational-actor theory and political realism. 
While much has been written on each of these, two fundamental assumptions 
underpin Hardin’s argument. The first assumption, noted above, incorporates a 
positive claim about what constitutes ‘human nature’; namely, that individuals 
always pursue self-interest with the desire to maximize utility, lies at the heart of 
the rational-actor approach (Petracca 1991; Green and Shapiro 1994). The second 
assumption evolves readily from the first and has long been an integral, but mostly 
unstated, theme in political theory: that because people are driven primarily 
by self-interest, it is necessary to put into place, or to impose, some system of 
control in order to ensure peace and stability where a chaotic anarchy would 
otherwise obtain. That Hardin seems to embrace the political theory of Thomas 
Hobbes. Recall that Hobbes’s principal contribution to theory is his argument that 
political authority need not be provided by a doctrine of divine right, but could 
be established on purely naturalistic foundations. In Hobbes’s view, we must be 
subject to, and kept in “awe” by, a common and “paternal” power (1986, 185).
That Hardin’s conclusions, that only state-centric or market-oriented 
institutional arrangements resolve the deep problems inherent in social relations 
of production, naturally derive from the elemental principles of rational choice 
theory and, by extension, political realism – theoretical frameworks that are 
deeply flawed themselves, but wildly popular, particularly in Hardin’s day2
 – is 
fairly pronounced. Accordingly, when Hardin asserts that it is human nature that 
men are compelled to maximize personal gain regardless of the public welfare, 
and that in such a “dog-eat-dog” world, only a hegemonic “Leviathan,” or a 
“coercive force outside” our “individual psyches,” could countervail the ‘tragedy 
of the commons,’ reason dictates skepticism (1978, 314).
In the decades since Hardin’s influential article, much scholarship has 
emerged that challenge the underlying assumptions built into his argument 
– on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Following in the tradition of 
Kropotkin and Huxley (1955 [1902]), for example, who wrote partly responding 
to the growing popularity of theories advancing social Darwinism, many natural 
and social scientists today dismiss simplistic representations of human nature as 
being inherently selfish, and in fact suggest the opposite (Clark 1991; Wilson 
1998; Rilling, et al. 2002; Chapman and Sussman 2004; Henrich and Henrich 
2007; West et al. 2007; Adami and Hintze 2013). And while still dominant in 
the field of international relations and political theory, the political realism that 
partly originated in the writings of Hobbes has come under significant attack 
from Critical Theorists and others concerned with its integral commitment to 
2
 It is unlikely that Hardin would have been unaware of Gordon (1954) and Scott’s (1955) bio- 
economic models, which conceptualize commons degradation in much the same fashion, or that 
Hardin would have been unaffected by the ubiquitous appeal of political realism at the height of the 
cold war.
748 Pashupati Chaudhary et al.
reproducing relations of domination and power (Ashley 1981; Cox 1981; George 
1994; Vasquez 1998). But Hardin’s conclusions, too, have been demonstrated to be 
rather inadequate for properly analyzing commons governance, or lack thereof, and 
the policy interventions society presumably requires. In her 1990 book, Governing 
the Commons, Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, made a significant contribution to 
a growing body of literature showing that contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
Common-Pool Resources (CPRs) could be managed successfully without state 
intervention, or privatization. Through a detailed, comparative analysis of several 
case studies, Ostrom demonstrated that communities themselves can, and do, self-
govern shared resources, and sometimes with remarkable success.
In order to understand the innovative institutional regimes governing shared 
resources that Ostrom and others ‘discovered’ and evaluated, contemporary 
scholars have sought to analyze a number of important factors that may drive 
bottom-up institutional change towards new regulatory systems, resulting in 
sustainable practices in community governance of commons. Innes and Booher 
(2003), for instance, stress the importance of what they call “collaborative 
dialogue” for encouraging experimentation and building new networks of trust; 
Rodima-Taylor (2012) notes that decentralized organizational arrangements often 
improve community participation; Fraser et al. (2005), emphasize the need for 
environmental management experts to collaborate with community members; 
Crona and Parker (2012) underscore how “bridging organizations… facilitate 
collaboration and knowledge coproduction” between actors; Bowles and Gintis 
(2002) highlight social capital as critical in contributing to community governance; 
Upton (2012) underlines the influence of community partnerships with external 
supporters; and Chhetri et al. (2012), affirm that connectivity and inclusion of 
plural knowledge systems are powerful drivers of institutional innovation. Other 
determining variables, too, have been found to be “critical to the organization, 
adaptability, and sustainability” of CPR governance, including the nature of the 
resource system itself, the characteristics of its users, and the political, economic 
and social settings they inhabit (Agrawal 2001, 1651).
Given all these, and many more, theoretical perspectives and analytical 
foci on CPRs, the literature increasingly emphasizes the need for adopting 
a general framework so that scholars working across disciplines can critically 
investigate complex socio-ecological systems (SES), where commons are studied 
and governance carried out (Ostrom 2007, 2009; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). 
Related to the SES framework is the institutional analysis and development 
framework (IAD), initially articulated by Kiser and Ostrom in 1982, and since 
expanded upon (Kiser and Ostrom 2000; Poteete et al. 2010). The very thrust of 
the IAD framework is a microanalysis where boundedly-rational actors, either 
individually or collectively as formal or informal groupings, interact with each 
other to determine the outcomes (Ostrom 2011; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014).
Framed by the empirical observations and theoretical arguments advanced 
by Garrett Hardin and Elinor Ostrom, this paper offers a case study illustrating 
how a diverse community came together to collectively manage a shared natural 
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resource in the wider watershed of Nepal’s Rupa Lake. The history and current 
circumstance of Rupa Lake vividly depicts the development from a situation Hardin 
would doubtless have hailed as emblematic of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ into an 
exemplar of collaborative and sustainable CPR governance by local communities.
Once mired in conflict and environmental degradation, Rupa Lake has 
transformed itself. With the help of a cooperative formed among people relying 
on ecosystem services produced in the watershed, and with the modest support 
of a domestic NGO called Local Initiatives for Biodiversity, Research and 
Development (LI-BIRD), Rupa Lake today provides a textbook example of 
successful local stewardship of shared natural resources. In what follows, we will 
provide context to the factors leading up to both the commons mismanagement 
at Rupa Lake, and those factors that have been conducive to sustaining Rupa’s 
bottom-up approach to natural resource governance.
2. Rupa lake: the resource system, its actors, and governance 
system
Rupa Lake, like many other lakes around the country, collectively represent Nepal’s 
principal forms of CPR, harnessed for household water requirements, industry, 
irrigation, hydropower generation, recreation, and fisheries. Many of Nepal’s 
lakes, however, face multifaceted environmental problems and its dependents 
encounter numerous socioeconomic challenges, which frequently interlink with 
the local ecological conditions, and Rupa Lake is no different. Overexploited 
wild fish stocks, unsustainable agricultural practices, use of chemical fertilizer 
and pesticides, deforestation, soil erosion, sedimentation, hydroelectric damming, 
destructive fishing methods, untreated effluent discharges, road and building 
construction, and nonpoint source pollution have all threatened to destabilize 
Rupa Lake, degrading its watershed and jeopardizing the livelihood security of its 
integrated communities.
Located approximately 16 km northeast of Pokhara, at an altitude of 600 
meters above sea level, Rupa is the third largest lake in Kaski district in the 
western region of Nepal, situated just south of the massive Annapurna range that 
feeds the lake by a network of streams. Separated by the Pachabhaiya ridge from 
the much larger Begnas Lake only a few kilometers away, it covers an area of 1.12 
sq km running along from north to south. The average water depth of the lake is 
3.0 meters and maximum depth is 4.79 meters. Rupa’s water holding capacity is 
3.1 million cubic meters and its watershed extends over 30 km2 of steep slope 
comprising of forest and arable land (see Figure 1). Rupa’s watershed is also 
rich in biodiversity. The forests on the eastern and western part of the lake are 
dense whereby the major forest species include Sal (Shorea robusta), Chilaune 
(Schima wallichii) and Katus (Castanopsis indica). The surrounding forest and 
lake provides habitat for a number of different animal species, and more than 150 
species of birds and ducks (Kafle et al. 2008). The lake drains south to Tal khola 
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at Sistani ghat, joining the Seti Gandaki River, and ultimately discharges its fresh 
Himalayan waters nearly 1000 km away into the Bay of Bengal.
The northern and eastern parts of the lake’s watershed are densely populated. 
It is where most of the cultivated lands are found. Generally, farming, fishing, and 
tourism are the primary sources of income for the communities dotting the foothills 
of the Himalayas. While mountain climbing has long been an obvious attraction, 
nearby Rupa has also become a major tourist destination, hosting approximately 
3000 visitors every year. With respect to fishing, the three major lakes of Kaski 
district (Phewa, Begnas, and Rupa) collectively provide approximately 1.5 
megatons of fish a day to the expanding city of Pokhara, a short distance away 
(Gurung 2003).
Until the mid 1980s, direct lake users were composed mostly of fishermen, 
known as Jalahari – an ethnic group of over 50 shoreline households whose 
livelihoods are traditionally associated with fishing at Rupa. Over a short period, 
these households were gradually joined by a slow but steady influx of migrants, 
mostly other fishermen, from the surrounding hills. Perhaps keen to exploit the 
lake’s apparently abundant fish resources, these newcomers and the Jalahari 
began to experience competition as Rupa Lake’s user base expanded. Although 
Figure 1: Rupa Lake watershed area.
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the new households had no direct user right, they nevertheless became important 
system stakeholders. Their communities integrated: both groups practiced rod 
and net fishing, and both introduced more recent aquaculture activities together, 
leading, predictably, to increased catches.
According to Kugel and Huseynli (2013), roughly 15,000 individuals with 
different ethnic background, including the Majhi and Jalahari, live in moderately 
close-knit settlements across the lake’s catchment. A large number of them are 
also depended on the wetland resources for their livelihoods. Following Regmi 
et al. (2009), the communities inhabiting the lake watershed are divided into two 
distinct groups based on their geographic proximities – upstream and downstream 
villages. This form of group definition appears to be far more relevant in Rupa 
rather than by classifying communities based in caste and ethnicity – as commonly 
practiced in Nepal (Gurung et al. 2005). Farmers, youths, and particularly women 
also play an important part in community cohesion in Rupa (Udas 2007). Women 
also are actively involved in biodiversity conservation at Rupa (Regmi et al. 
2009).
Another important actor in Rupa is the a well recognized national NGO, Local 
Initiatives for Biodiversity Research and Development (LI-BIRD), which began 
working in the area in 1998 through a project called “Strengthening the Scientific 
Basis for Agro-biodiversity Conservation On-farm.” Since then, the organization 
has regularly worked with the local communities through development-oriented 
agricultural and natural resource management projects with the twin goals 
of promoting institutional and policy change, and improving local livelihoods 
through poverty alleviation. This group has been particularly important, as we 
will see, for building up social capital and cultivating leadership at the local level.
The Rupa watershed has multiple political institutions that make up a 
somewhat complex and overlapping system of governance. Nepal itself has five 
administrative layers to any location. Rupa Lake is located just east of the major 
city of Pokhara (famous tourist destination). Pokhara, the second largest city in 
Nepal, is the headquarters of the Western Region, and is also located in the center 
of Kaski District, an important administrative zone in Nepal as it oversees the 
entirety of the Annapurna Conservation Area, the largest protected area in Nepal. 
Along with the Lekhnath Municipality, the Rupakot, Hansapur, and Majhthana 
Village Development Committees (VDCs), all of which are essentially localities, 
constitute the most local-level dimension of governance directly over Rupa Lake. 
Rupakot, Hansapur, and Majhthana, however, have a more indirect governing 
relationship with Rupa as they merely border the lake, and their populations are 
overwhelmingly engaged in agriculture, as opposed to fishing, as the primary 
livelihood activity. The complex and layered nature of the governance system in 
and around Rupa points to its extended and bureaucratic structure, but also to the 
in cohesive and hierarchically distant relationship between networked governing 
components – from the lowly Village Development Committee, to the executive 
at the national level and prone to occasional failure (Khadka 1991; Shrestha 1997; 
Perrow 1999; Gautam et al. 2004).
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3. Methodology
Our assessment draws on two data sets: a) focus group discussions (FGDs) and 
interviews with key informants representing both upstream and downstream 
catchment, and b) systemic review of historical archives, meeting minutes, 
and progress reports of the Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative 
(Cooperative) and the Local Initiatives for Biodiversity Research and 
Development (LI-BIRD). Additionally, several authors of this paper, both from 
LI-BIRD and Arizona State University, have made frequent visits to the area and 
several of them have assisted the community in social mobilization, and in the 
formation of cooperative planning for sustainable watershed management. Recent 
LI-BIRD projects include scale-up of Rupa learning to the surrounding lakes, 
supported by a Swiss Resource Award. An earlier project focused on Payment for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) through watershed management, which was supported 
by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). CARE-Nepal 
also implemented watershed-based conservation and development projects in the 
region.
We conducted 5 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with officials (past 
and present) of the Cooperative. The interviews lasted between 1 and 2 hours 
and were stopped if the information became redundant. The purpose of face-to-
face interviews was to understand the history and the background that led to the 
formation of the cooperative, the challenges of running such cooperative, and 
mitigation measures taken by the members. The interviews were structured in two 
parts. Part one was dedicated to understanding the history of the lake resources, 
its users, and the experience of resource use. We also asked if any external help 
was received in the process of the formation of the cooperative. Part two focused 
on knowledge integration, developing practices, and the evolving governance 
mechanisms of the Cooperative in response to emerging challenges. We further 
used this opportunity to triangulate information obtained from secondary sources 
and author’s observation.
To identify knowledge integration, practices, and governing mechanisms 
involved in the management of Rupa Lake and its watershed, we conducted 
two FGDs (May–June 2013). The first FGD was held with 12 members of the 
cooperative from upstream communities, the second with 15 members from 
downstream communities. Because of our focus on understanding the history of 
the rehabilitation of Rupa, we targeted informants with longstanding interest and 
direct experience in the rehabilitation project. The interviewees were asked to 
share (i) information with regard to the users base of Rupa, (ii) important events 
and activities conducted by the community, (iii) management experience of the 
rehabilitation project, and (iv) information on the governance of the Cooperative.
We further reviewed the historical archives to gather quantitative information 
with regard to membership, annual fish catch, profit, and investment in ecosystem 
services. Some of the documents we reviewed include meeting minutes, auditor’s 
reports, and monthly records of the fish catch as recorded by the cooperative.
A collaborative effort to manage watershed commons 753
4. Common-pool resource governance: top-down or bottom-up?
4.1. Tragedy of the commons
In Hardin’s article for Science, he describes a scenario, hypothetically applicable 
to all forms of commons – from grazing pastures and groundwater reserves to lake 
fisheries – in which all individuals are permitted to freely exploit an open access 
resource for their personal gain. Hardin argues that the selfish and myopic nature 
of each user of the common resource invariably leads them to continuously expand 
their own operations to increase personal benefits, whilst neglecting (consciously 
or not) the external costs to the commons (which are conveniently divided 
amongst all). Unrestrained resource users therefore unknowingly march towards 
the inexorable destruction of the commons, as the cumulative damage of each 
individual’s continually expanding extraction eventually exceeds the resource’s 
carrying capacity, bringing “ruin to all” (Hardin 1968, 1244). To counter the 
inevitable “tragedy” awaiting open-access resources, Hardin asserts that shared 
resources must either instituted under a private-property rights regime; or highly 
regulated, taxed, or licensed – a burden that could only be responsibly shouldered 
by a tightly centralized, rationally optimized, bureaucratic state (1978). In any 
other situation, he implies, the overarching principles of sustainable management 
and environmental conservation fall prey to resource users’ rampant hunt for 
personal profit. Most importantly, his presumption of universality is a prima facie 
case of intellectual over-extension (Basurto and Ostrom 2009).
4.2. Governing the commons through local institutions
Partly responding to Hardin’s pessimistic worldview (which was, and in some 
cases still is, widely accepted as fact), Ostrom proposed that Hardin’s argument 
nevertheless represented a crudely simplistic and wildly unrealistic description of 
CPR systems of use, as a common resource completely devoid of any management 
structure or governance regime by the users themselves is improbable and indeed 
incoherent (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999). Hardin’s dueling solutions of 
either total state control or aggressive privatization clearly disregards the myriad 
institutional mechanisms occupying a middle ground between centralized 
government control and simple individual autonomy, whether regulated by 
market forces or not. In fact, Ostrom argues that communities can, and in most 
cases have, created, harnessed, or modified existing institutional arrangements 
to govern the commons they share. While identifying institutions as per Western 
standards has sometimes proved difficult, as they may be formal, consisting of 
cooperatives, or informal, as in the case of trusts, cultural groups, mother groups, 
and the like (Lansing 1991).
The effective governance of a common pool resource by local institutions 
is certainly far from guaranteed, however. Nepal’s struggles since the last three 
decades to ensure the dual objectives of the conservation of its woodlands and 
tangible gains for forest users through its Community Forestry (CF) program 
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are a testimony to the governance of commons. After forestry management 
responsibilities were formally devolved to local communities in the 1990s, CPR 
management often hinged on relationships within stratified user communities 
dictated by wealth, status, power, caste, and gender (Nightingale 2011). In some 
cases such disparities have determined individuals’ access to and control over 
shared resources (Acharya 2002; Nagendra 2002; Agrawal and Gupta 2005), but 
in other cases it has allowed all users equal access to forest resources (Ojha and 
Kanel 2005; Persha et al. 2011).
Successful governance of CPRs via bottom-up, community-based institutional 
arrangements can be a challenge. Identifying rightful users, creating mechanisms 
for participatory governance, developing inclusive policies, institutionalizing 
rules and regulations, and implementing enforcement mechanisms all would 
appear to be daunting tests even to the most resolute policy-maker. But once 
such an assemblage has successfully taken root, dismantling it might appear 
equally alarming. In the course of this case-study, it was revealed that the entire 
governance structure was tightly bound-up with each other in a new socio-
ecological system that in turn discursively reproduced and reinforced. In what 
follows we will attempt to tease-out the dynamic interrelations that led to Rupa’s 
innovative institutional change; in turn, analyzing the fragmented genealogies, 
multiple meanings, and potential futures awaiting Rupa Lake.
5. Conflict and tragedy at Rupa Lake
5.1. A complex picture
Rupa Lake’s history seemingly fits well into Hardin’s bleak narrative, offering 
an illustrative example of a ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ in action. But it is more 
complicated than that. During the 1950s, and before, Rupa Lake was effectively 
governed as an open-access resource and was traditionally used by only a small 
population of Jalahari (fisher folks) households living on its shorelines, without 
much in the way of systemized management. Locals freely practiced net and rod 
fishing and over the ensuing years cage and pen aquaculture interventions were 
slowly introduced with technical helps from Fisheries Development Centre of the 
government of Nepal.
Up until the early 1990s, a number of other problems had also become much 
too conspicuous to ignore. First, with the expansion of infrastructure projects 
from the nearby urban centre of Pokhara, people began extending ever closer 
to the lake watershed where locals were already experiencing the pressure of 
migrants from surrounding hills. Unregulated stone mining, construction of 
roads, overgrazing and deforestation resulted in the formation of active landslides 
across the watershed – ultimately increased sediment load on Rupa Lake. While 
there was undeniable appreciation towards the infrastructure projects by all, the 
lake watershed declined precipitously. With population growth, new inhabitants 
began to exploit the lake’s resources alongside the traditional Jalahari fishing 
communities. Faced with non-local competition, a result of the construction of a 
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new road to Pachbhaiya and Tal Khola, independent lake users began extracting 
maximum personal harvests from the fishery without restraint, leading to rising 
tensions between its growing user-base. The ecological costs of a steadily 
degrading aquatic ecosystem stoked feelings of resentment between lakeside 
inhabitants and their upstream counterparts. These tensions were not abetted by 
the poor interconnectivity between distant up and downstream communities, and 
the consequent lack of efforts to cooperatively resolve disputes and settle growing 
umbrages (Pokharel and Nakamura 2012).
Relentless fishing led increasingly to heated disputes among the growing 
diversity of communities sharing the lake frontier, many of whom were new to the 
institutional dynamic that had been adapted at Rupa over many decades. Quarrels 
over the ownership of portions of the water body, the allocation of fishing rights 
(dictated by whoever arrived first), and the conservation of unmeasured fish 
populations were commonplace. This was further complicated by the introduction 
of aquaculture activities promoted jointly by Nepal’s Agricultural Development 
Bank and the Government’s Fishery Development Program.
Middlemen, too, exploited fragmented user groups to dominate access to 
Pokhara’s market, extracting a healthy slice of fishers’ profits (Pradhan et al. 2010).
Beyond the lake itself, other serious problems arose which put increased 
stress on the watershed and its inhabitants – many of which were attributable 
to Nepal’s effort to modernize, inspired by its neighbors (Rose 1971; Khadka 
1991). Regional commercial and industrial development, hydropower and dam 
construction, unregulated irrigation and agriculture run-off, over-grazing, habitat 
fragmentation and deforestation, and biodiversity decline (including species 
extinction) combined to greatly increase pressure on the surrounding watershed. 
Expanded, government sanctioned, agricultural activities on nearby hillsides 
placed a heavy burden on the entire ecosystem. The deforestation of steep 
landscapes for terraced agriculture, timber and firewood collection, and increased 
livestock grazing also began to concern lakeside inhabitants as they witnessed the 
gradual erosion of the slopes encircling Rupa Lake. Although by the mid-1990s 
government policy reversed and the control of local forests was devolved to local 
communities, reforestation efforts remained trivial compared with the growing 
and unrestrained agricultural and fishing activity, which continued unabated 
(Oakley 1991; Pokharel and Nakamura 2012).
Watershed inhabitants, particularly the new arrivals, while presumably aware 
of the consequences of their increasingly destructive actions, nevertheless did not 
curtail them. In fact, national government policy for the most part encouraged such 
activity as far as it could contribute to agricultural and economic productivity. 
As hill slopes continuously shed their soils and the lake gradually shrank, blame 
was liberally heaped upon upstream users by those living on the lake shores. 
Downstream users were frustrated by the lack of control from upstream users and 
their seemingly inconsiderate decisions to not only deforest the hillsides, but to 
continue house and road construction works during the monsoon seasons, further 
exacerbating the flow of sediment into the lake (Basnet 2008).
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In an attempt to correct the growing power imbalances and disconnect 
between the two communities, concerned residents presented their worries to state 
representatives through written petitions and persistent visits to local government 
offices. Unable or unwilling to intervene, government authorities and concerned 
line agencies simply ignored the developing situation and the appropriation of 
management responsibilities remained unclear and poorly implemented. This 
apparent lack of interest in Rupa Lake by regional civil servants and government 
bureaucrats, however, might be better attributed to the fact that during this time 
Nepal was extremely politically unstable. From 1996 to 2006, the country was 
embroiled in a bloody and destructive civil war between the Communist Party of 
Nepal (which had created weak, poorly resourced provisional governments at the 
district level) and the Nepal government that repeatedly dissolved the parliament 
and carried out numerous civilian killings (Bell 2014).
5.2. Decline of the commons
While transparently not insulated from the political instability surrounding Rupa 
Lake, and the various modernization projects that directly impacted it, throughout 
the 1990s, a general lack of common accord locally and between communities 
to reverse the destructive trends to the watershed persisted. Despite the fact both 
upstream and downstream residents were aware of the deteriorating situation, 
some measure of which was out of their hands, nothing concrete was done to 
mitigate the problems they faced. Increasingly, the ecosystem services produced 
in the watershed were under threat, and this plainly affected Rupa’s communities 
in a variety of ways.
Sedimentation of the lake became a major issue for fishery users, with entire 
fields created by sediment deposits emerging at the northern shore of the lake. 
Quickly reclaimed by opportunist rice paddy farmers, this new land became a 
source of conflict. Even the Rupakot VDC allowed the construction of a secondary 
school in reclaimed land in early 1980s. The deepest point of the lake decline and 
as a result cage farming became impracticable in some areas.
Rupa’s progressive rising intake of agricultural runoff and effluent deposits 
from surrounding settlements and siltation from soil erosion gradually loaded lake 
waters with nutrients. By 2000, Rupa was heavily colonized by aquatic weeds 
such as the invasive water hyacinth, blue green algae, pickerel weed, and lotus, 
facing the threat of rapid eutrophication. As the thick mantle of weeds restricted 
access to the lake water, locals noticed a significant reduction in fish populations. 
As a consequence, fishing activities began to decline.
From the 1980s, the relative open-access nature of Rupa Lake’s fishery, the 
growing population and development, swelling animosity between user-groups, 
and failure to tackle damaging externalities of the watershed’s exploitation 
seemingly fulfill Hardin’s prediction about common resource management. 
‘Freedom on the commons’ in Rupa certainly appeared to be leading to ‘the ruin 
of all,’ resulting in a ‘tragedy of the commons’. Following Hardin’s advice, one 
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would be inclined to suggest that only a strong and restrictive intervention policy 
set by the Nepali state would reverse the declining situation. The remaining 
requirement would only be to somehow wrestle fishing rights from both traditional 
Jalahari and the more recent arrivals, and to strictly regulate and monitor land use 
in the hills. The subsequent action of Rupa’s local community members, however, 
reveals that alternatives to Hardin’s desperate options exist. More in accord with 
Ostrom’s findings, concerned lake users and watershed stakeholders instead acted 
cooperatively and in collaboration in order to preserve their lake commons.
6. Turning conflict into collaboration
A wealth of scholarship exists today that seeks to explain institutional change 
and collective action towards self-organization and self-governance of shared 
resources. Ostrom (1990, 39) notes that “at the most general level, the problem 
facing CPR appropriators is one of organizing: how to change the situation from 
one in which the appropriators act independently to one in which they adopt 
coordinated strategies to obtain higher joint benefits or reduce their joint harm.” 
Agrawal’s (2001) synthesis of the facilitating conditions identified by Ostrom and 
others serve to highlight some of the key features (design principle) that may 
account for such a shift. The size of the user group, the location and nature of the 
resource, the relative homogeneity and interdependence among group members, 
past experiences with cooperation, and external aid together make up “some 
of the themes” emphasized as being “significant to achieve cooperation” (ibid, 
1653). In all, ten second-level variables have been “observed and measured by 
field researchers” which are “posited to affect the likelihood of users’ engaging 
in collective action to self-organize” and manage a resource, in line with the SES 
framework (Ostrom 2009).
In 2001, Varughese and Ostrom acknowledged existence of unresolved 
theoretical issues and again in 2009, in a paper coauthored with Basurto, she 
noted the core challenges of explaining why some resource users are able to self-
organize and govern the use of a resource over time and in a sustainable manner 
(Basurto and Ostrom 2009). While the work of Ostrom and her colleagues on 
IAD framework is partially useful in helping to organize heuristically external 
variables, and actors and actions in their interactions and their discursive outcomes, 
we believe that more work needs to be done so that the collaborative shift, to 
the extent that one takes place at all, may be better explained. After all, systems 
of classification, no matter how intricate, combined with relational propositions 
alone do not make a record of change, but merely provide the minimal components 
of an explanatory mechanism (Meehan and Long 1968).
In the case of Rupa Lake, arguably a unique instance, two theories, perhaps 
combined in some way, may help to reveal how ‘conflict’ translated into 
collaboration. One model of collective action introduced by Hargrave and Van 
De Ven (2006, 884) views “institutional change as a dialectical process in which 
partisan actors espousing conflicting views confront each other and engage in 
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political behaviors to create and change institutions.” From this perspective, the 
“generative mechanism of change” is “dialectics” and “according to [this] model, 
change is a field-level property that emerges from interactions among the members 
of the field” (ibid, 884). That the animus produced at the lakeside between upstream 
and downstream communities was overcome by the creation of an innovative 
institutional dynamic that empowered Rupa Lake inhabitants, finally allowing them 
to sustainably govern their shared resources. In fact this institutional innovation may 
be attributable to ‘conflict’ itself. In this case, then, it was the interactions between 
actors involved in a “problematic situation” that allowed for the ‘emergence’ of 
multi-stakeholder collaborative learning and cooperation, ultimately leading to a 
process of institutional innovation (Woodhill 2010). Another approach, found in 
Crona and Parker (2012), emphasizes the importance of “boundary organizations” 
in facilitating collaboration through linking multiple actors through some form of 
collaboration. Acting as a source of information, a broker, deal negotiator, and a 
mediator of conflicts (ibid), a well-respected and well-integrated NGO, LI-BIRD, 
may have filled such a role of boundary organization.
Lastly, the influence of the larger institutional setting in which the communities 
of Rupa were embedded cannot be overstated. This idea was “central” to James 
March’s theoretical work on institutions and organizations; that any social action 
is also linked to a historical context of which they are part (Dosi and Levinthal 
2003). Following Ostrom (2003), too, noted that the variables outlined in the 
framework of SES is influenced and mediated by the larger regime in which users 
are embedded. If the larger regime recognizes the legitimacy of communal systems, 
the probability of participants adapting more effective rules over time is higher 
than in regimes that presume that all decisions about governance and management 
need to be made by central authorities (ibid). Nepal’s three decades of experience 
in successful devolution of authority to local communities, especially in forest 
management, likely provides significant background to Rupa’s willingness and 
ability to cooperatively engage in natural resource governance themselves.
6.1. Cooperative formation
In 2000, two community based organizations – Jaibik Shrot Samrachan Abhiyan 
(Bioresources Conservation Movement), KiDeKi (Farmers to Farmers) – and 
representatives from both downstream and upstream communities organized 
to form the Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative (Cooperative). 
The Cooperative was registered in Lekhnath, the governing municipality. In its 
first year, an eleven-member interim committee was formed, but that increased 
to fifteen immediately after the registration of the Cooperative, whereby the 
additional four seats were set-aside for representation from minority communities. 
During this initial stage, a total of 36 households/individuals joined as members 
of the Cooperative, each committing shares of 5000 NPR (US$ 65).
These committee members provided their time and intellectual resources purely 
on a voluntary basis. With critical support from LI-BIRD, the Cooperative established 
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a benefit sharing mechanism to provide incentives to communities and various 
upstream user groups to conserve the catchment. Additionally, LI-BIRD provided 
training for farmers and forestry groups in sustainable practices, and for community 
members in biodiversity conservation, including technical assistance and other aid 
to the Cooperative. LI-BIRD also began to implement wetland management and 
community-based biodiversity management programs in the area.
6.2. Restoration of traditional rights
Replacement of traditional rights to CPRs by new actors without proper consultation 
to its rightful users is often a source of conflict (Dietz et al. 2003). Rupa experienced 
a similar fate. Implemented as one of their first policies, the Cooperative imposed a 
total ban on fishing by any individual, putting a cap on livelihoods options for large 
numbers of lake users. Hardest hit were the members of the Jalahari communities. 
This led to an initial tension between the Cooperative and the Jalahari as the 
members of the Cooperative were blamed for stealing their traditional rights to 
livelihoods. Disagreements in these first months intensified to a point where the 
leaders of the Cooperative received threats from heated opponents. Mediated by the 
representatives from LI-BIRD, members of the Village Development Committees 
(VDCs) and the Lekhnath municipality, several rounds of reconciliatory meetings 
between the members of the Cooperative and the Jalahari community were held. 
This enhanced the participatory nature of the Cooperative, and making it inclusive. 
During this process many Jalahari individuals were selected as new cooperative 
members, one elected to fill the post of vice chairperson, and two (one male and 
one female) as executive members. Additionally, the members of the Jalahari 
communities were allowed to join the Cooperative with reduced membership 
fees, and were given a temporary fishing permit for an initial buffer-period of six 
months. They were also encouraged to apply for jobs in an area they were known 
for their boating, fishing and net weaving skills.
Not long after, the Jalahari community began to play a significant role in 
managing the Cooperative, enjoying reduced membership fees, salaried jobs, 
representation in the executive committee, and scholarships for their children to 
attend school. The Cooperative also began to hire full-time employees at average 
monthly wage of NPRs 7000 in 2003 and NPR 14,500 in 2013 (US$ 155). The 
structure of governance of the Cooperative, grounded in the principle of fairness 
and equality, gradually brought a sense of hope. Cooperative employees, both 
Jalahari and others, repeatedly described the rewarding sense of livelihood 
security they had found in a regular wage as opposed to relying solely on daily 
independent fish sales.
6.3. Reaping the benefits
Rupa fish were sold exclusively through the Cooperative to individuals and 
entrepreneurs in Pokhara for prices fixed by the committee in the beginning of each 
month. This policy of fixed prices substituted the earlier one based on negotiation 
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between sellers and buyers, which unfortunately favored the latter. One of the 
noticeable outcomes of this fixed-price policy was an immediate gain of profits 
for the Cooperative. Annual profit rose by 20%, and annual fish catch increased by 
over 35% (see Table 1). In year 2003 (first year of operation), net profit reached 
NPR 1,463,889 (approximately US$ 19,199), followed by NPR 4,501,430 (US$ 
65,724) in 2008, and NPR 6,070,637 (US$ 67,452) in 2013. The early success of 
the Cooperative demonstrated its obvious value to the members of the community, 
who, not surprisingly, were skeptical in the beginning. As a result of this success, 
membership in the cooperative increased steadily, as did membership fees: NPR 
5000 (US$ 71) in 2003, followed by NPr 12,000 (US$ 175) in 2008, to NPR 
16,000 (US$ 178) in 2013.
Year after year, new members enthusiastically contributed to join the 
Cooperative, some of them being elevated to leadership roles. The executive 
committee regularly meets to discuss pricing policy, lake rehabilitation, and other 
personnel issues, including membership fees. In addition, all members are invited 
to participate in the annual general assembly. During the general assembly, 
members are provided with progress updates, as well as the dividend of their 
investment, which was calculated to be NPR 3,482,000.00 (US$ 38,690) in 2013.
Table 1: Rupa Lake Restoration and Fishery Co-operative ltd: Membership, employee, fish 
catch and net profit, 2003–2013.
Year Members 
(women)








2002 36 (0) NA 5000
(64)
NA NA NA
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6.4. Expanding its institutional role
With the decision to expand membership to all watershed inhabitants (lower 
and upper), the members of the Cooperative increased from an initial 36 in year 
2002 to an impressive 444 in 2008, and 746 in 2013 (approximately 40% of 
whom are women). These impressive gains in Cooperative membership clearly 
illustrates their achievement in drawing the attention of a larger set of watershed 
stakeholders into an inclusive circle of direct resource users, many of whom had 
been disengaged or excluded from the benefits that the Cooperative was enjoying.
To date, with the expansion of membership, the scope of the Cooperative 
has also widened. The Cooperative has adopted several new fishery projects. For 
example, in 2012, six nursery ponds on the north bank of Rupa were constructed so 
that the Cooperative could begin a fingerlings breeding scheme. Additionally, this 
past year, the Cooperative also set aside one of the nursery ponds to exclusively 
raise fish species indigenous to the region.
With the suggestion from LI-BIRD, a new species of Grass Carp 
(Ctenopharyngodon idellus) was introduced in 2008 to control invasive weeds. 
While a complete elimination of this weed took nearly a year, it is considered to 
be a successful intervention that the members of the Cooperative are very proud 
of. In the ensuing years, the Cooperative also began introducing fingerling stocks 
to revive the fish population. Whilst catches are nearly always totally sold, the 
Cooperative also invested in a solar drier, allowing surplus fish products to be 
preserved and sold for a better price. In addition to their fishing duties, Cooperative 
employees also perform overtime shifts in lake maintenance, tending nets and 
performing security rounds to ensure that fishing rules are actively enforced.
6.5. Payment for Watershed Services (PWS)
The inclusion of the greater watershed communities of Rupa through their engagement 
in the governance of the lake ecosystem also draws attention to the value of watershed 
services. According to Asquith and Wunder (2008), PWS is a conceptual cousin of 
the Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). Generally, the PES approach has had 
some success, however in most observed cases governments, rather than NGOs or 
cooperatives, are involved in buying the watershed services. Huang et al. (2009) 
explain that disconnect between economic goals and environmental outcomes 
have encouraged experimentation with PES. Additionally, the failure of top-down 
policy on environmental governance associated with the challenge of addressing 
the needs of a politically and economically marginalized upland communities, an 
ongoing process of political decentralization, [and] limited trust in markets have 
contributed to the adoption of PWS adoption in Asia. Although there is a challenge 
of monitoring environmental services and tracing their source, watershed services 
scheme that is implemented by the Cooperative across the watershed of Rupa Lake is 
exemplary. Most importantly the PWS program has fostered collaboration between 
upstream and downstream communities. Reconnecting communities with the lands 
that provide livelihoods, cultural heritage, and recreational opportunities that they 
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Table 2: Investment for payment for watershed services by Rupa Lake Restoration and Fishery 
Cooperative Ltd.








Support in cash 
NPR (US$)
2064/2065 100,000 Mothers Groups 6 Group 24,000 (350)
(2008) (1460) CFUGs 12 Groups 38,000 (555)
Schools 10 Schools 20,000 (292)
Scholarship 34 Students 18,000 (263)
2065/2066 110,000 Mothers Groups 6 Groups 24,000 (320)
(2009) (1467) CFUGs 15 Groups 41,000 (546)
Schools 15 Schools 25,000 (333)
Scholarship 40 Students 20,000 (266)
2066/2067 115,000 Mothers Groups 6 Groups 25,000 (337)
(2010) (1554) CFUGs 15 Groups 42,000 (567)
Schools 15 Schools 25,000 (337)
Scholarship 52 Students 23,000 (311)
2067/2068 125,000 Mothers Groups 7 Groups 28,000 (390)
(2011) (1742) CFUGs 17 Groups 44,000 (613)
Schools 19 Schools 22,000 (307)
Scholarship 52 Students 26,000 (362)
Youth Clubs 5 Clubs 5000 (70)
2068/2069 150,000 Mothers Groups 6 Groups 42,000 (469)
(2013) (1685) CFUGs 17 Groups 50,000 (558)
Schools 19 Schools 25,000 (279)
Scholarship 52 Students 26,000 (290)
Youth Clubs 5 Clubs 7000 (78)
2069/2070 150,000 Mothers Groups 6 Groups 45,000 (500)
(2013) (1667) CFUGs 17 Groups 50,000 (556)
Schools 19 Schools 25,000 (278)
Scholarship 52 Students 26,000 (289)
Youth Clubs 5 Clubs 4000 (44)
CFUGs = Community forestry users group.
value is critical to mitigate threats to the overall health of the lake ecosystem. As 
both up and downstream communities attempt to satisfy multiple demands with 
limited resources, investment of the Cooperative in watershed management has 
been a critical force in sustaining the bottom-up approach to CPR governance at 
Rupa cooperative.
Since 2008, the Cooperative has devised a policy to contribute about as much 
as 25% of its annual net profit after all expenses to projects aimed at sustainable 
management of the lake’s watershed. As shown in Table 2, local Mothers Groups, 
Youth Clubs, Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs), and schools receive 
financial and technical support to conduct a range of activities in the watershed. 
Also stemming from this fund are annual educational scholarships for 50 students 
from both upstream and downstream communities. Last year, the Cooperative 
invested NPR 150,000 (US$ 1685) in activities related to watershed health, of 
which NPR 95,000 (US$ 1100) was invested in 6 Mothers Groups and 17 CFUGs 
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(see Table 2). To put these numbers in perspective, from 1984 to 1997, the Begnas 
Tal Rupa Tal Watershed Management Project (BTRT), co-implemented by CARE-
Nepal and the Government of Nepal, had an operational budget of US$ 3,272,765.
Womens’ Groups receiving financial support from the Cooperative engage in 
a number of activities that benefit the watershed including preserving indigenous 
plant species in the watershed’s wetlands, organizing awareness camps on the 
role of biodiversity in watershed services, and leading hands-on training in 
organic farming techniques – low-tech capacity building for high-end rewards 
and income generation. Some of the most successful income generating activities 
include beekeeping, goat rearing, and backyard poultry, where local women also 
contribute. As illustrated in Table 3, some other conservation activities include 
fencing off habitat for wild rice and wild bird nesting.
The activities conducted by the CFUGs with the Cooperative’s support 
include protection of natural forest, policing illegal felling, bio-engineering 
activities to stabilize gullies, the installation of gabion boxes to protect active 
landslides, tree plantation in marginal lands, and forest fire protection. Since 2008, 
the CFUGs have also installed over 300 biogas digesters for cooking. The Youth 
Clubs have been very active in preserving the wetlands surrounding the lake, and 
also in attracting tourists to visit the area. The funds received by the local Rupa 
school, that also feed into the Youth Clubs, are used for various environmental 
awareness programs, including essay and art competitions, debating events, and 
for purchasing and designing posters.
Table 3: Activities conducted by the collaborators supported by the Rupa Lake Restoration and 
Fishery Co-operative ltd.
Collaborators Activities performed
Mothers group 1.  Preservation of indigenous plant species in the watershed
2.  Management of wetlands surrounding Rupa Lake 
3.  Awareness for biodiversity conservation
4.  Hands-on training on organic farming
5.  Low tech and high reward income generating activities
Community forestry 
users group (CFUGs)
1.  Protection of natural forest for healthy watershed
2.  Bio-engineering activities to stabilize active landslides
3.  Afforestation of degraded lands
4.  Protection from forest fire 
Schools 1.  Increasing awareness on the importance of wetland biodiversity
2.  Education of the importance of eco-tourism in the area
3.  General information on the consequences of climate change
4.  Essay competition on local and global environmental issues
5.  Scholarship support to the children of economically marginalized members 
of the community such as Jalahari
Youth clubs 1.  Community development through engaging youth
2.  Skill training on income generating activities such as bee keeping
3.  Training on the value of biodiversity conservation
4.  Hands-on training on home gardening
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Driven by the overarching goal of conserving the Rupa watershed through 
reduced deforestation and soil erosion, the activities promoted and implemented 
by the Cooperative are also geared toward preserving the lake fishery itself. 
Active investment in restoration and maintenance of a flow of ecosystem services 
of the lake can be characterized as PWS in that the exchange for the economic 
value obtained from the fishery’s growing economic importance directly 
impacted sustainable watershed management activities. The success of schemes 
implemented by the Cooperative in the watershed of Rupa Lake also illustrate 
that its utilization of PWS has had numerous and positive pro-poor impacts, more 
so than other environmental management interventions prescribed in the past. An 
inclusive approach, designed and implemented by the Cooperative, to manage the 
lake and its watershed can also empower the poor and marginalized communities 
by recognizing them as valued members of society. The Cooperative might be 
able to diversify their overall income net worth by enhancing the overall health of 
watershed ecosystems. This includes enhancing the habitat for wildlife and birds, 
preserving biodiversity, and maintaining habitat for medicinal and herbal plants 
found in the area. They have also initiated management of the lake biodiversity 
by establishing and maintaining different conservation blocks, which are being 
managed by mother groups, cooperatives, and women groups. In the different 
conservation blocks, they have conserved wild rice, local fishes, wetland floras 
(such as white lotus and kade simal), and birds.
7. Ongoing challenges
7.1. Fishery management
As shown in Table 1, Rupa’s fishery has greatly increased its harvest and stocking 
rates over the last decade, stabilizing rising demand by establishing its own 
nursery to repopulate the lake with both exotic and indigenous fish species. 
However, as both conventional fishing theories (Beverton and Holt 1957; Ricker 
1975) and the upholders of CPR self-governance (Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988; 
Agrawal 2001) state, the relationship between the resource itself (here the fish 
stock) and the institutional body governing it (the Cooperative) should ensure 
that harvest rates are closely matched to the regeneration of resource units. While 
the Cooperative has been able to steadily increase annual fish catch, the absence 
of comprehensive investigation masks two possible eventualities. First, it may 
be that the Cooperative is complacent about current catch and not exploring 
options towards a maximum sustainable yield – a best-case scenario. A second, 
more troubling contingency, is that focusing simply on annual fish catch may 
hide a situation akin to Pauly’s ‘sitting baseline syndrome’ (1995), wherein stable 
catches disguise a gradual, long-term depletion of the resource while seemingly 
persistent catch rates eventually lead to an unforeseen collapse in fish stocks 
(Mullon et al. 2005). In either case, more research into harvest rates, fish stock 
trends, and current repopulation efforts should be employed to estimate Rupa’s 
potential yield.
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7.2. Monitoring and enforcement
An additional issue facing the Cooperative lies in its ability to effectively monitor 
and enforce its own lake-use rules, which remain a fractious issue for certain 
inhabitants and continue to be challenged on a regular basis. Lake patrols by 
Cooperative employees, often supported by government police protecting 
their own aquaculture projects, routinely encounter illegal fishers. Equipment 
confiscations and threats of physical violence appear to be failing to deter a 
number of persistent youths who regularly return to ‘plunder’ the lake’s resources, 
either by rod fishing or stealing from unattended Cooperative nets. Whilst the 
vast majority of Rupa’s surrounding population respect Cooperative rules, this 
ongoing issue presents significant costs to the Cooperative, including an additional 
workload for employees. The establishment of clearly stated graduated sanctions, 
perhaps leaning on the support of government officials to enforce fines or even 
arrests, may strengthen the Cooperative’s current enforcement efforts.
7.3. Community cohesion
While the inclusive nature of the Cooperative is innovative, the sharing of 
endowments between upstream and downstream communities is not as transparent 
as it could be. This may undermine the Cooperative’s efforts to expand outreach 
to the greater watershed population in equitable manner. During the FGD, 
several upstream members expressed concern about the continued domination of 
downstream communities in the management of the Cooperative. This is despite 
increased cooperation and participation from the upstream community. Members 
of the upstream community also feel that whether they are members or not, they 
are being ‘watched’ by the Cooperative for their supposedly environmentally 
irresponsible behavior. Unfortunately, the current size, and financial and technical 
resources of the Cooperative precludes at present the comprehensive inclusion 
of all those residing in upstream areas. Their eventual participation, however, 
even if limited, is a prerequisite for the continued success of the Cooperative 
because their land use practices determine the fate of Rupa Lake in the longer 
term. Further, convincing those upstream communities who have not yet adopted 
Cooperative standards in environment-friendly agricultural practices might pose 
a challenge to the Cooperative.
Greater efforts to build upon and enhance the institutional network in Rupa 
watershed are needed to improve dialogue between upstream and downstream 
communities. Part of the challenge to such negotiations involves the significant 
difference in resource endowments between watershed inhabitants, which is 
fraying the fragile social capital that the Cooperative initially produced. While 
the well-watered downstream fields benefit from two rice growing seasons, and 
a relatively flat landscape providing easy access to their fields, the upstream 
communities do not. Further, upstream areas have not benefited much from 
downstream investments in new roads, which provide quick connections to 
markets. Also, physical proximity to educational opportunities and medical 
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services have greatly benefited the downstream communities, while the upstream 
communities have been marginalized in this respect. These perceived advantages 
that one community has over the other has inspired blame and resentment. In 
order to ameliorate tensions, new deliberative and participatory forums may be 
required where members (and non-members) from upstream can voice opinions, 
complaints, and requests constructively without fear or exclusion. These, and 
other related issues, will require ongoing community negotiation efforts, building 
strong social capital, while advancing forward with policy transparency in 
information and benefit sharing across the landscape. IAD framework will be 
helpful to systematically assess the ongoing challenges among upstream and 
downstream stakeholders and develop a realistic plan to address them (Ostrom 
2011; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014).
8. Conclusion
The history of Rupa Lake appears at first glance to illustrate a descent into a 
tragedy of the commons scenario, displaying numerous symptoms of Hardin’s 
dire predictions. However, the institutional innovation that occurred during the 
past decade defies Hardin’s restrictive selection of solutions. Instead of privatizing 
the watershed, or nationalizing it, the upstream and downstream communities 
of Rupa Lake took it upon themselves to establish a Cooperative that would 
eventually lead the declining ecosystem to prosperity and environmental health. 
Not unlike the community-based environmental management systems explored 
by Ostrom and others, the Rupa Lake cooperative, and its subsequent inclusion 
of other inhabitants of the watershed, has displayed a reversal of ‘ruin for all’ on 
the commons and an embrace of bottom-up solutions. The cooperative institution 
has built upon the attributes of the lake resource itself, and communities have 
continued to invest in repopulating fish stocks and restoring the surrounding 
watershed. Membership expansion plans led to not only a widened and well-
regulated user group, but to the incorporation of stakeholders who previously 
engaged the lake commons only through the degrading effects of their activities. 
The sustainability of the Cooperative’s governance model is underpinned by a 
solid and reliable economic return and a transparent management process led by 
a core of dedicated committee members. The inclusion of watershed inhabitants 
in both the management of the lake fishery and in conservation efforts, through 
stringent self-regulation and a generous benefit-sharing program, including 
restoration of Jalahari family’s traditional rights to access to benefits, has further 
aided to concretely define the relationship between local inhabitants and their 
duties in commons governance. The cooperative as an institution has securely 
embedded itself within local political and economic settings, whilst gaining a 
respected position amongst the majority of local inhabitants.
The obstacles facing the Cooperative in its governance role remain difficult to 
overcome, however. Both the exploitation of the fishery itself, and the meaningful 
integration of a large watershed containing disparate and heterogeneous 
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communities with numerous differences, remain problems that the Cooperative 
struggles to investigate and reconcile. The establishment and growth of the 
Rupa Lake cooperative, however, provides a compelling case for the potential 
of commons users to reverse their resource’s fate from tumbling into Hardin’s 
seemingly inevitable tragedy. This case study demonstrates that motivated and 
dedicated communities can themselves create and sustain the type of strong 
institutional system Hardin thought impossible: one dedicated to and capable of 
sustainably managing the commons. This model might be replicated in other lake 
watersheds and river basin regions of the country to combine collective efforts of 
upstream and downstream communities for sustainably managing the resources 
shared by them. The learning from this case study might also be adopted across 
the world where similar social and biophysical situations are present.
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